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Teaching Rule Synthesis
with Real Cases
Paul Figley
Rule synthesis is the process of integrating a rule or principle from several
cases.1 It is a skill attorneys and judges use on a daily basis to formulate
effective arguments, develop jurisprudence, and anticipate future problems.2
Teaching new law students how to synthesize rules is a critical component in
training them to think like lawyers.3
While rule synthesis is normally taught in legal writing classes, it has
application throughout the law school experience. Academic support programs
may teach it to students even before their first official law school class.4 Many
professors convey analytical lawyering skills, including rule synthesis, in their
1.

Richard K. Neumann, Jr. & Sheila Simon, Legal Writing 55 (Aspen 2008) (“Synthesis is the
binding together of several opinions into a whole that stands for a rule or an expression of
policy.”).

2.

Jane Kent Gionfriddo, Thinking Like A Lawyer: The Heuristics of Case Synthesis, 40 Tex.
Tech L. Rev. 1, 7 (2007). On a more pedestrian level, good litigators develop the facility to
read the cases cited by an opponent in support of its proposed rule, and synthesize from
them a different, more credible rule that undermines the opponent’s case.

3.

See id. at 7; see also Kurt M. Saunders & Linda Levine, Learning to Think Like A Lawyer, 29
U.S.F. L. Rev. 121, 125 (1994).

4.

See Sonia Bychkov Green, Maureen Straub Kordesh & Julie M. Spanbauer, Sailing Against
the Wind: How A Pre-Admission Program Can Prepare at-Risk Students for Success in
the Journey Through Law School and Beyond, 39 U. Mem. L. Rev. 307, 328 (2009); Mark
Graham & Bryan Adamson, Law Students’ Undergraduate Major: Implications for Law
School Academic Support Programs (ASPs), 69 UMKC L. Rev. 533, 541–42 (2001).
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doctrinal courses.5 Rule synthesis has obvious utility for clinicians and others
who supervise interns.6 Mastering synthesis skills can help students integrate
doctrinal material and succeed on law school exams.7
Many students new to the law have a difficult time grasping how to do rule
synthesis.8 To avoid the process, some pick one promising quotation from a
group of cases and declare it to be their rule of law. Others may serially discuss
all the cases on an issue and compare each with the facts of the matter at hand,9
in effect, doing a mini-IRAC analysis for each cited case.10 Neither approach
is adequate. Students must learn to read a body of law and integrate their
understanding of it into one simply stated, readily applied rule.
This article suggests how rule synthesis might be taught in one classroom
session using real cases. It advocates a three-part approach. First, explain the
nature of rule synthesis to the students. Second, do a whimsical exercise with
them to show how rule synthesis works. Finally, break into small groups and
synthesize a rule from real cases for a hypothetical problem. Massachusetts
judges have written a number of very short opinions regarding banana peel
litigation. Accordingly, the hypothetical problem suggested involves a banana
peel slip-and-fall case set in Boston. Because these opinions are so short,
students will have time in class to read them and synthesize a rule from them.
In working through the exercise students will see that different rules can be
synthesized from the same set of cases.
1. Principles of Rule Synthesis
Any structured legal argument needs a rule to apply to the facts of the
situation. If an attorney is faced with a single statute that sets forth the rule of
law, the attorney can simply quote the relevant portion of the statute as the rule
applicable to the issue at hand, the R portion of the CREAC paradigm.11 The
5.

See Nelson P. Miller & Bradley J. Charles, Meeting the Carnegie Report’s Challenge to
Make Legal Analysis Explicit—Subsidiary Skills to the IRAC Framework, 59 J. Legal Educ.
192, 198–99 (2009); Andrea A. Curcio, Gregory Todd Jones & Tanya M. Washington, Does
Practice Make Perfect? An Empirical Examination of the Impact of Practice Essays on Essay
Exam Performance, 35 Fla. St. U. L. Rev. 271, 313 (2008); Susan E. Provenzano & Lesley S.
Kagan, Teaching in Reverse: A Positive Approach to Analytical Errors in 1L Writing, 39 Loy.
U. Chi. L.J. 123, 161–162 (2007).

6.

See Bernadette T. Feeley, Training Field Supervisors to Be Efficient and Effective Critics of
Student Writing, 15 Clinical L. Rev. 211, 224–225 (2009).

7.

Adam G. Todd, Exam Writing As Legal Writing: Teaching and Critiquing Law School
Examination Discourse, 76 Temp. L. Rev. 69, 87 (2003).

8.

See Provenzano & Kagan, supra note 5, at 164.

9.

See generally id.

10.

Students need to master Rule Synthesis whether the analytical structure they are learning
is IRAC (Issue, Rule, Application, Conclusion), CREAC (Context-Conclusion, Rule,
Explanation, Application, Conclusion), TREAT (Thesis, Rule, Explanation, Application,
Thesis), CRuPAC (Context, Rule, Proof, Application, Conclusion), or something else.

11.

Our program uses CREAC and this article will use it as a sample analytical structure.
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same approach can be used if a single controlling case is directly on point and
dictates the outcome of the problem. Stating the rule is not typically that easy.
If it derives from a statute, cases may have interpreted the statutory language,
adding to or changing the rule. Frequently, a number of cases will have dealt
with the same issue. Each case may state and apply the rule just as previous
cases had. Alternatively, cases may state the rule differently, apply it differently,
seem to say something entirely different, or overrule prior decisions implicitly
or explicitly. These latter situations require rule synthesis.
Students should not analyze an issue by doing a case-by-case comparison
of the situation at hand with the cases on point.12 That kind of presentation
is unsynthesized, and forces the reader to do what she expected the lawyer to
have done for her, which was to read and analyze a set of cases and to present
her with an explanation of how they tie together. To do this—to synthesize a
rule—the attorney must examine the authorities that have applied a body of
law in actual situations, derive from those applications the key principles of
interpretation, and state those principles as a rule.
A rule should meet three criteria. First, it should be simply stated—concise
enough for the reader to grasp easily. Second, it should be readily applied—
unambiguous because the terms have defined, non-circular meanings,13
specific enough to give guidance for a new set of facts, but not too narrow
to be useful. Third, it should be consistent with the cases and law in the
jurisdiction—if applied to the existing cases, the rule would accurately predict
the outcome of each.14 Students should remember that they synthesize rules
12. A typical case-by-case analysis might go like this:
		
		
Summers v. Tice, 199 P.2d 1 (Cal. 1948), requires that when one of two negligent
tortfeasors caused an injury, the burden is on each of them to show that the injury was
not caused by his act. Applying that rule here, unless defendant can show that his car
did not strike plaintiff’s decedent, which he cannot do given these facts, he is liable.
		

In a case involving two fires that merged into one, the Supreme Court of Minnesota
held that when two causes combine to cause damage, and either alone would have caused
that damage, the source of each cause is liable for the damage. Anderson v. Minneapolis,
St. P. & S. St. M. R.R. Co., 179 N.W. 45 (Minn. 1923). Applying that rule, defendant is
liable because his car alone could have caused plaintiff’s decedent’s death.

13.

A rule that “the court shall do justice” does not provide a meaningful basis for predicting
what will happen in the client’s case. Nor is it helpful to the reader to define “reasonable
care” as “care that is reasonable or sensible.”

14.

These criteria for good rules were suggested by Dan Weddle, director of academic support
and clinical professor, University of Missouri-Kansas City School of Law, at the 2007
Central States Regional Legal Writing Conference. These criteria reflect the problems
beginning legal writers actually encounter when they approach rule synthesis. Professors
Provenzano and Kagan studied 265 closed-universe, fall semester memoranda written by
their 1L students over four years. Provenzano & Kagan, supra note 5, at 149, 151. They found:

		

[T]he students struggled to articulate rules from the case law that govern and define
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in the first place in order to predict the outcome of a legal problem they have
been asked to address. They will be better able to make predictions if the rules
they synthesize are easily understood, readily applied, and consistent with the
pertinent authorities.
2. Crabby Mrs. McGinty’s Garden Hose
With a basic understanding of the goals of rule synthesis, students can
address a whimsical problem and apply their developing skills. One such
problem involves crabby Mrs. McGinty and her garden hose.15 The goal is to
predict from past practices when Mrs. McGinty will turn her hose on visitors.
Mrs. McGinty’s prior garden hose decisions could be passed out to the class
or presented in PowerPoint. After reading each scenario the students should
be able to formulate a statement of Mrs. McGinty’s holding in that instance.
Once they have absorbed all the holdings they should synthesize a general
rule for Mrs. McGinty’s practice that is simply stated, readily applied, and
consistent with all her prior actions. After they have synthesized their rule,
they should be ready to predict what Mrs. McGinty will do in new situations
by applying their rule to new facts. Students generally enjoy this exercise.
Mrs. McGinty’s Garden Hose Practices
On Sunday, two neighborhood boys, Cletis Culpeper and Tucker Carlton,
Jr., sneaked onto Mrs. McGinty’s property to taunt Mrs. McGinty’s dog
Houndie with sticks. Mrs. McGinty came off the porch and doused the boys
with water from the garden hose, yelling, “You varmints get off my lawn a-fore
I shoot you dead!” The boys ran away.
Rule: Uninvited people teasing the dog get hosed.
On Monday, Parson Skeeter nodded to Mrs. McGinty from the sidewalk,
and Mrs. McGinty waved him over, calling, “Parson Skeeter, come out of
the sun for a spell and have some lemonade with me on the porch.” Parson
Skeeter ambled up the driveway past the “Keep Out” signs and sat a spell
with Mrs. McGinty, nodding repeatedly as Mrs. McGinty regaled him with
details of her battle with scabies.

a legal element. Specifically, 19.25[percent] of our students struggled to state a clear
and concrete rule of law that would be comprehensible to the unfamiliar reader.
Another 32.83[percent] of our students struggled to develop a rule section without
stating repetitive rules that were circular or that merely repeated the first rule in different
words. Lastly, 34.34[percent] of our students stated rules of law that were too narrow,
representing an incomplete synthesis of the case law.
Id. at 152.
15.

I was introduced to this problem by Christy DeSanctis, director of legal research and writing
at the George Washington University School of Law.
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Rule: Invited people do not get hosed.
On Tuesday, Trixie Pepper wandered onto Mrs. McGinty’s property to
pick honeysuckles for a bonnet she was making. Mrs. McGinty sprang from
behind the bushes with the garden hose, spraying Trixie and ruining her new
home perm. Mrs. McGinty shouted, “Trixie Pepper, you brazen jezebel, you
better get off my lawn a-fore I shoot you dead!” Trixie high-tailed it off Mrs.
McGinty’s property in a flash, sobbing the whole way.
Rule: Uninvited people taking flowers get hosed.
On Wednesday, Hooterville had its annual Founders Parade. Billy Joe
Sandpiper was dressed as Abe Lincoln in a top hat and was walking down
the street on stilts when suddenly a pig escaped from one of the 4-H cages,
knocking Billy Joe over and onto Mrs. McGinty’s property. Having seen the
incident, Mrs. McGinty came over, dusted Billy Joe off and offered him some
lemonade.
Rule: Uninvited people in a civic celebration who are forced onto property
through no act of their own do not get hosed and do get lemonade.
On Thursday, Cletis Culpeper was being chased by a swarm of hornets, so he
ran onto Mrs. McGinty’s property and dove into the pond in the backyard.
Mrs. McGinty saw the whole incident and laughed so hard, she fell clear off
her rocking chair. She didn’t bother with the garden hose or the shotgun.
Rule: Uninvited people who come onto the property to avoid physical injury
do not get hosed.
On Friday, Tucker Carlton, Jr. was chased onto Mrs. McGinty’s property
by Trixie Pepper, who was wielding a cricket bat and threatening to bash
Tucker’s head in for using her best dress to keep his prize-winning piglets
warm. In running from Trixie, Tucker trampled Mrs. McGinty’s patch of
cucumbers (which she intended to sell at the county fair) and damaged the
gate to Mrs. McGinty’s chicken coop. Mrs. McGinty did not spray Tucker
with water, given the ferocity of Trixie’s swats with the cricket bat, but she
immediately called his parents and demanded that they reimburse her for the
damaged cucumbers and chicken coop.
Rule: Uninvited people who come onto the property to avoid physical injury
do not get hosed but will be held responsible for any damage they cause.
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Rules derived from each episode:

Sunday Rule: Uninvited people teasing the dog get hosed.
Monday Rule: Invited people do not get hosed.
Tuesday Rule: Uninvited people taking flowers get hosed.
Wednesday Rule: Uninvited people in civic celebrations who are
forced onto the property through no act of their own do not get hosed
and do get lemonade.
Thursday Rule: Uninvited people who come onto the property to
avoid physical injury do not get hosed.
Friday Rule: Uninvited people who come onto the property to avoid
physical injury do not get hosed but will be held responsible for any
damage they cause.
From Mrs. McGinty’s prior hosing decisions the students can synthesize
a formula (rule) for predicting Mrs. McGinty’s behavior in future cases. The
prior hosing decisions collectively might be synthesized into this rule:
A person who voluntarily enters Mrs. McGinty’s property without permission
will be hosed, regardless of the reason for entering onto the property, unless
entry is necessary to avoid physical danger, in which case the person is liable
for actual damage to the property.

This rule could be set forth in outline form. A person will be hosed if the
person:
voluntarily
enters Mrs. McGinty’s property
without permission.
Exception:
if a person enters the property to avoid physical danger
that person will not be hosed;
but that person is liable for actual damage caused.
This rule is easily understood, readily applied, and consistent with Mrs.
McGinty’s prior actions.
At this point the students are ready to apply their rule to new scenarios—the
application part of their analytical structure.16 The instructor should highlight
that the students will apply their synthesized rule to the facts of the client’s case
to reach a conclusion. Given the rule they have synthesized for Mrs. McGinty,
the students can predict what would happen in new situations:
Holly Golightly tiptoes quickly into Mrs. McGinty’s garden to pick a tomato.
A kid on a bike in the Sunflower Parade loses control and crashes onto the
property.
16.

It is the A in the CREAC, IRAC, TREAT, or CRuPAC methodology.
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A parade watcher intentionally jumps over the fence and onto the property to
get out of the kid’s way, squashing four of Mrs. McGinty’s squash.

They will readily see that Holly voluntarily entered the property without
permission and will be hosed. They will correctly predict no hosing for the
child who lost control of his bike and did not enter the property voluntarily.
Likewise, they will calculate that the parade watcher who jumped the fence to
avoid injury falls within the exception and would not be hosed, but would be
liable for any resulting damages.17
3. Massachusetts Banana Peel Slip-and-Fall Cases
The students should now be ready to work in small groups on rule synthesis
using real cases. To help focus their analysis, students can use a fact situation
involving a banana peel slip-and-fall case in Massachusetts:
Sandy Banks was excited to visit the historic sites of Boston. Upon arriving in
the city Sandy went immediately to Faneuil Hall, even though it was 4:30 in
the morning. Sandy went to the main entrance, saw that the shops were closed,
but wandered around the building, gazing and pondering the meaning of
history. Sandy then slipped and fell. Although in great pain, Sandy looked
around and spotted a brown, leathery banana peel, six inches in length, lying
on the gray, slate floor.
Custodians employed by Faneuil Hall are responsible for sweeping up every
night after the businesses close at 9:00 p.m. (6:00 p.m. on Sundays).

The students should then be asked whether Sandy will be able to recover
damages from Fanueil Hall. They should recognize that they do not know the
answer.
Four Massachusetts banana peel slip-and-fall cases provide a good vehicle
for this classroom exercise because they are very short and readily understood.18
These cases are typical of food on the floor cases. As a general matter, someone
in control of a premise has a tort duty to keep the floor reasonably clear of
hazards. Negligence will be found if the defendant unreasonably fails to clean
a hazard off its floor and someone slips on that hazard, falls and is injured.
On the other hand, there will be no negligence if a plaintiff slips on a hazard
that the defendant exercising reasonable care did not know was there. In these
17.

Mrs. McGinty and her garden hose might be revisited when the students turn to advocacy,
using scenarios that play around the edges of the rule. For example, if “the mailman comes
on the property with the mail,” there is a fair question whether he had implied permission
to do so. Alternatively, if “Mrs. Skeeter leaves a TupperWare party thrown by Mrs. McGinty
and picks a petunia on her way off the property,” Mrs. Skeeter certainly had permission to
enter the property, but whether she exceeded that permission when she picked the flower
may be debated.

18.

These four opinions are just a sampling of Massachusetts slip-and-fall law.
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Massachusetts cases there was no direct evidence (eyewitnesses, photographs,
etc.) that the defendant had breached its duty to keep its premises safe. The
issue in each was whether the plaintiff had presented enough circumstantial
evidence to support the conclusion that the defendant had sufficient notice of
the hazard (the presence of a banana peel) so that it could have removed that
hazard but negligently failed to do so.
The four banana peel cases should be presented one at a time to students,
using print versions of the cases. The West headnotes for these cases form
an important part of this exercise, and the headnotes in Westlaw’s electronic
versions are not identical to the print versions.19 Because the cases contain
unexpected twists it is important for the instructor to read them carefully
before class.
A. Goddard v. Boston & Maine Railroad Company.20
GODDARD
v.
BOSTON & M. R. CO.
(Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Suffolk May 22, 1901.)
CARRIERS – INJURY TO PASSENGER
Where a passenger alighting from train slips on a banana skin, and there is
no evidence as to length of time it had been on platform, he is not entitled to
recover.
Exceptions from superior court, Suffolk county.
Action by Wilfred H. Goddard against the Boston & Maine Railroad
Company for personal injuries received by falling upon a banana skin lying
upon the platform at defendant’s station at Boston. The evidence showed
that defendant was a passenger who had just arrived, and was about the
length of the car from where he alighted when he slipped and fell. There was
evidence that there were many passengers on the platform. Verdict directed
for defendant, and plaintiff excepts. Exceptions overruled.
John E. Crowley, for plaintiff. Walter I. Badger and Sanford Robinson, for
defendant.

19.

The opinions set forth in the text of this article contain the language of the print versions of
the cases. Because the West headnotes are part of the exercise, only the West versions of the
cases are used.

20.

60 N.E. 486 (Mass. 1901).
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HOLMES, C. J. The banana skin upon which the plaintiff stepped and which
caused him to slip may have been dropped within a minute by one of the
persons who was leaving the train. It is unnecessary to go further to decide
the case.
Exceptions overruled.

Here, Justice Holmes held that there could be no liability because the
banana peel may have been dropped by a passenger who had just arrived.21
The students might derive this holding (rule) from the case:
Rule 1A: A jury may not infer that a defendant was negligent for failing
to remove a banana peel if a “just arrived” passenger may have dropped
it.
Once they have finished, one group can report its rule to the entire class.
Other students can then comment on it.
B. Anjou v. Boston Elevated Railway Company.22
ANJOU
v.
BOSTON ELEVATED RY. CO.
(Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Suffolk. March 3, 1911.)
Carriers (§ 318*)—Injury to Passengers—Slipping on Station Platform—
Negligence—Evidence
Testimony in an action for injury to a passenger on an elevated railroad, by
slipping on a banana peel on the carrier’s platform, describing the peel in the
following terms: “It felt dry, gritty, as if there were dirt on it,” as if “trampled
over a good deal,” as “flattened down, and black in color,” “every bit of it
was black, there wasn’t a particle of yellow,” and as “black, flattened out,
and gritty,” authorized an inference that it had not been dropped a moment
before by a passenger, and consequently furnished evidence of negligence of
the carrier’s employee at the station, whose duty included the observing and
removing of anything on the platform interfering with the safety of passengers.
Report from Superior Court, Suffolk County; John F. Brown, Judge.
Action by Helen G. Anjou against the Boston Elevated Railway Company.
Verdict was directed for defendant, and the case reported. Judgment for
plaintiff.

21.

Id.

22.

94 N.E. 386 (Mass. 1911).
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J. J. Cummings and H. J. Dixon, for plaintiff. John E. Hannigan, for
defendant.
RUGG, J. The plaintiff arrived on one of defendant’s cars on the upper level
of the Dudley Street terminal; other passengers arrived on same car, but it
does not appear how many. She waited until the crowd had left the platform,
when she inquired of one of defendant’s uniformed employees the direction
to another car. He walked along a narrow platform, and she, following a few
feet behind him toward the stairway he had indicated, was injured by slipping
upon a banana peel. It was described by several who examined it in these
terms: It ‘felt dry, gritty, as if there were dirt upon it,’ as if ‘trampled over a
good deal,’ as ‘flattened down, and black in color,’ ‘every bit of it was black,
there wasn’t a particle of yellow,’ and as ‘black, flattened out and gritty.’ It was
one of the duties of employees of the defendant, of whom there was one at this
station all the time, to observe and remove whatever was upon the platform
to interfere with the safety of travelers. These might have been found to be
the facts.
The inference might have been drawn from the appearance and condition
of the banana peel that it had been upon the platform a considerable period
of time, in such position that it would have been seen and removed by the
employees of the defendant if they had been reasonably careful in performing
their duty. Therefore there is something on which to base a conclusion that
it was not dropped a moment before by a passenger, and Goddard v. Boston
& Maine R. R., 179 Mass. 52, 60 N. E. 486, and Lyons v. Boston Elevated
Railway Co., 204 Mass. 227, 90 N. E. 419, are plainly distinguishable. The
obligation rested upon the defendant to keep its station reasonably safe for its
passengers. It might have been found that the platform was suffered to remain
in such condition as to be a menace to those rightfully walking upon it. Hence
there was evidence of negligence on the part of the defendant, which should
have been submitted to the jury. MacLaren v. Boston Elevated Railway Co.,
197 Mass. 490, 83 N. E. 1088; Foster v. Old Colony St. Rly. Co., 182 Mass. 378,
65 N. E. 795; Rosen v. Boston, 187 Mass. 245, 72 N. E. 992, 68 L. R. A. 153;
Kingston v. Boston Elevated Rly. Co., 93 N. E. 573.
In accordance with the terms of the report, let the entry be:
Judgment for the plaintiff for $1,250 with costs.

In Anjou the court issued a judgment against the railway when a woman
slipped on a “dry, gritty” banana peel, “black in color” because the jury could
have inferred that “it had been on the platform a considerable period of
time.”23 The students might derive this holding (rule).
23.

Id.
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Rule 1B: A jury may infer that a defendant was negligent for failing to
remove a banana peel if its appearance and condition suggest it had
been on the floor for a considerable period of time.
Again, the entire class can discuss one group’s rule.
C. Mascary v. Boston Elevated Railway Company.24
MASCARY
v.
BOSTON ELEVATED RY. CO.
(Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Suffolk. March 4, 1927.)
Carriers [key] 318(2)—Showing only that plaintiff slipped on banana peel on
defendant’s public stairway held insufficient to support recovery for injuries.
Evidence showing only that plaintiff slipped and fell on banana peeling on
stairway owned by defendant, and open to public, held insufficient to support
recovery, absent any showing of defendant’s negligence.
Report from Superior Court, Suffolk County; E. T. Broadhurst, Judge.
Action by Josephine Mascary against the Boston Elevated Railway Company.
On report after verdict for plaintiff. Judgment for defendant.
E. Masters, of Boston, for plaintiff.
S. P. Sears, of Boston, and E. K. Nash, of Weston, for defendant.
RUGG, C. J. There was evidence tending to show, in its aspect most favorable
to the plaintiff, that while descending a flight of stairs leading to the Central
Square Station of the defendant she slipped and fell, and immediately
thereafter a piece of banana peel was found underneath her shoe; that her
husband, going forthwith to the place where she fell, found there a part of a
banana skin, dark or ‘black as tar,’ and dry, ‘a little dry skin, very black,’ and
‘it was smoothed down, * * * soft * * * as if something had been pressed on
it.’ The defendant owned and controlled the stairway and it was open to the
public.
There was no evidence of negligence on the part of the defendant. The
banana skin may have been dropped a moment before by a stranger to the
defendant, or have come upon the stair without fault of the defendant. The
case is governed by numerous decisions. Goddard v. Boston & M. R. Co., 179
24.

155 N.E. 637 (Mass. 1927).
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Mass. 52, 60 N. E. 486; Pearson v. Director General of Railroads, 245 Mass.
158, 162, 163, 139 N. E. 488; O’Neil v. Boston Elevated Railway, 248 Mass.
362, 142 N. E. 904, and cases there collected; Sweatland v. Springfield Public
Market, 247 Mass. 268, 142 N. E. 46; Towne v. Waltham Watch Co., 247 Mass.
390, 393, 141 N. E. 675; O’Brien v. Boston Elevated Railway, 250 Mass. 192, 145
N. E. 259; O’Leary v. Smith, 255 Mass. 121, 150 N. E. 878. Additional factors
tending to show negligence of the defendant present in Anjou v. Boston
Elevated Railway, 208 Mass. 273, 94 N. E. 386, 21 Ann. Cas. 1143, distinguish
that case from the case at bar.
The motion of the defendant for a directed verdict in its favor ought to have
been granted. In accordance with the terms of the report, the entry may be
Judgment for defendant.

Here, a woman slipped on a “black as tar,” “smoothed down,” “soft”
banana peel on a stairway.25 Despite a jury verdict for the plaintiff, judgment
was entered for the defendant.26 The court reasoned, “There was no evidence
of negligence on the part of the defendant. The banana skin may have been
dropped a moment before by a stranger to the defendant, or have come upon
the stair without fault of the defendant.”27
This result seems surprising and apparently at odds with the rule derived
from Anjou. It is unlikely that the quandary arose from Mascary misinterpreting
Anjou; Justice Rugg wrote both opinions. He evidently thought the decisions
were consistent, explaining that “[a]dditional factors tending to show
negligence of the defendant present in Anjou…distinguish that case from the
case at bar.”28 Perhaps some confusion arose from the Anjou headnote which
stated that the banana peel’s ‘“black, flattened out, and gritty,’ [condition]
authorized an inference that it had not been dropped a moment before by
a passenger, and consequently furnished evidence of negligence….”29 Of
course, a headnote or syllabus published with an opinion is not precedent, a
lesson our students should learn early in their careers.30

25.

Id.

26.

Id.

27.

Id.

28.

Id.

29.

Anjou v. Boston Elevated Ry. Co., 94 N.E. 386 (Mass. 1911).

30.

As the Supreme Court explained in United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200
U.S. 321, 337 (1906):
[T]he headnote is not the work of the court, nor does it state its decision, though
a different rule, it is true, is prescribed by statute in some states. It is simply the
work of the reporter, gives his understanding of the decision, and is prepared for the
convenience of the profession in the examination of the reports.
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Obviously the Mascary court saw more in Anjou than was included in our
Rule 1B. Upon re-reading Anjou, the students will note (with guidance) its
statement that:
[Ms. Anjou] waited until the crowd had left the platform, when she inquired
of one of defendant’s uniformed employees the direction to another car. He
walked along a narrow platform, and she, following a few feet behind him
toward the stairway he had indicated, was injured by slipping upon a banana
peel….It was one of the duties of employees of the defendant, of whom there
was one at this station all the time, to observe and remove whatever was upon
the platform to interfere with the safety of travelers.31

Because the actions and duties of the employee are the only facts in the
Anjou opinion other than the plaintiff’s actions and the condition and location
of the banana peel, they likely are the “[a]dditional factors tending to show
negligence of the defendant present in Anjou,” noted in Mascary.32 With this
information and the outcome in Mascary, the students might derive this holding
(rule).
Rule 1C: A jury may infer that a defendant was negligent for failing to
remove a banana peel if its appearance and condition suggest it had
been on the floor for a considerable period of time,
and an employee of the defendant was present
[and/or, guided plaintiff to the hazard]
[and/or, was assigned the duty to observe and remove hazards].
D. Scaccia v. Boston Elevated Railway Company.33
SCACCIA
v.
BOSTON ELEVATED RY. CO.
(Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Suffolk. Nov. 8, 1944.)
***
14. Carriers [key] 318(1)

31.

94 N.E. at 386.

32.

155 N.E. at 637.

33.

57 N.E.2d 761 (Mass. 1944). The Scaccia opinion is much longer than the others, though
only a brief segment pertains to the slip and fall issues. The other portions of the opinion
and the headnotes pertaining to those portions have been excerpted. They should also be
excerpted or marked out in copies of the opinion given to students.
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Where passenger boarded motor bus at terminus of line, where bus had
remained without passengers for at least a minute or two, when there was a
banana peel, four inches long, black, pressed down, covered with sand and
gravel, and dry, on floor in aisle, on which passenger slipped on leaving bus
nine minutes later, evidence warranted finding that peel had remained on floor
so long that in exercise of due care operator of bus should have discovered
and removed it, rendering operator liable for passenger’s injuries.
15. Damages [key] 130(1)
$750 was awarded bus passenger for injuries sustained in slipping on a banana
peel on the floor of a motor bus.
On report from Superior Court, Suffolk County; Williams, Judge.
Action by Constance Scaccia against the Boston Elevated Railway Company
for personal injuries resulting from slipping on a banana peel on floor of
defendant’s motor bus, tried before a judge of the Superior Court, sitting
without a jury on an “agreed statement of facts” submitted as evidence, from
which the judge and the Supreme Judicial Court might draw inferences
of fact. The judge denied plaintiff’s request for a ruling that the evidence
warranted a finding for plaintiff, found for the defendant, and reported case
for determination of the correctness of his ruling.
Judgment entered for plaintiff.
See, also, 56 N.E.2d 465.
Before FIELD, C. J., and LUMMUS, DOLAN, and RONAN, JJ.
E. J. Donlan, of Boston, for plaintiff.
S. P. Sears, of Boston, for defendant.
LUMMUS, Justice.
After the decision in Scaccia v. Boston Elevated Ry., 308 Mass. 310, 32 N.E.2d
253, this action of tort for personal injuries, resulting from slipping on a
banana peel which was on the floor of a motor bus operated by the defendant
in which the plaintiff was a passenger, was tried before a judge of the Superior
Court, sitting without jury, upon an ‘agreed statement of facts’ submitted as
evidence, from which the judge could draw inferences of fact.
***
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[14] We now come to the merits of the ruling. When the plaintiff boarded the
defendant’s motor bus at Cleary Square in the Hyde Park section of Boston
at noon on October 2, 1934, it could have been found that there was on the
floor in the aisle, near the front of the bus, a banana *252 peel ‘four inches
long, all black, all pressed down, dirty, covered with sand and gravel, dry and
gritty looking.’ When the plaintiff left the bus nine minutes later, she slipped
and fell on the banana peel, which remained in the same position. Only three
passengers were in the bus during the trip. It could have been found that
Cleary Square was one terminus of the line, and that the bus remained there
without passengers in it for ‘a minute or two’ at least. The bus was operated
by one man.
The question is whether the foregoing basic facts warrant an inference of
negligence on the part of the defendant or its operator. No one would be
likely to enter the bus except servants of the defendant and passengers. In
the ordinary course of events, no passenger would carry into the bus a banana
peel, or a banana, in the condition shown by the agreed facts. Such a condition
naturally would result from lying a considerable time on the floor. We think
that it could be found that the peel had remained on the floor of the bus so
long that in the exercise of due care the defendant should have discovered
and removed it. Anjou v. Boston Elevated R. Co., 208 Mass. 273, 94 N.E. 386,
21 Ann.Cas. 1143. See also Foley v. F. W. Woolworth Co., 293 Mass. 232, 199
N.E. 739.
A number of cases in which the unexplained presence on floors or stairs of
discarded parts of fruit was held insufficient evidence of negligence may
be distinguished. In Goddard v. Boston & M. R. R., 179 Mass. 52, 60 N.E.
486, the banana peel did not appear to be other than fresh. In Mascary v.
Boston Elevated R. Co., 258 Mass. 524, 155 N.E. 637, where a banana peel was
much like that described in the Anjou case, it lay on stairs leading from the
street, and might **766 have been recently thrown there by a child in play. In
McBreen v. Collins, 284 Mass. 253, 187 N.E. 591, and Newell v. Wm. Filene’s
Sons Co., 296 Mass. 489, 6 N.E.2d 820, the plaintiff fell on a lemon or orange
peel that showed no marks of age comparable to those in the present case.
In other cases the cause of the injury was an apple core or other fruit which
would become discolored sooner than a banana peel would become in the
condition described in the evidence in the present case. O’Neill v. Boston
Elevated R. Co., 248 Mass. 362, 142 N.E. 904; *253 Sisson v. Boston Elevated
R. Co., 277 Mass. 431, 178 N.E. 733; Renzi v. Boston Elevated R. Co., 293
Mass. 228, 199 N.E. 738.
[15] In accordance with the terms of the report, judgment is to be entered for
the plaintiff as upon a finding for $750.
So ordered.
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In Scaccia, a passenger boarded a bus at its terminus, rode for nine minutes,
and then slipped on a banana peel near the front of the bus while departing.34
The banana peel was “‘four inches long, all black, all pressed down, dirty,
covered with sand and gravel, dry and gritty looking.’”35 At the terminus,
the bus had stopped for several minutes and all passengers had departed.36
Based on the condition of the banana peel the court allowed the inference of
negligence: “We think that it could be found that the peel had remained on the
floor of the bus so long that in the exercise of due care the defendant should
have discovered and removed it.”37 The court noted that no one was likely to
carry a black banana peel onto a bus.38 It went on to distinguish Goddard and
Mascary, stating:
In Goddard…the banana peel did not appear to be other than fresh. In
Mascary…where a banana peel was much like that described in the Anjou case,
it lay on stairs leading from the street, and might have been recently thrown
there by a child in play.39

The students might conclude Scaccia made this holding (rule).
Rule 1D: A jury may infer that a defendant was negligent for failing to
remove a banana peel if its appearance and condition suggest it had
been on the floor for a considerable period of time,
and no one other than its patrons or employees could have placed it
there.
[and/or, a recent inspection should have discovered it].
E. A Synthesized Massachusetts Banana Peel Rule
At this juncture, each group should synthesize a rule from all four cases
together. One such synthesized rule might be:
A jury may infer that a defendant was negligent for failing to remove
a banana peel if its appearance and condition suggest it had been on
the floor for a considerable period of time,
And either an employee of the defendant was present, or no one other
than its patrons or employees could have placed it there.
Alternatively, the synthesized rule could be:

34.

Id. at 765.

35.

Id.

36.

Id.

37.

Id. at 765 (citing Anjou v. Boston Elevated Ry. Co., 94 N.E. 386 (Mass. 1911)).

38.

Id.

39.

Id. at 765–66.
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A jury may infer that a defendant was negligent for failing to remove
a banana peel if its appearance and condition suggest it had been on
the floor for a considerable period of time,
And either an employee guided plaintiff to the hazard or a recent
inspection should have discovered the hazard.
Or:
A jury may infer that a defendant was negligent for failing to remove
a banana peel if its appearance and condition suggest it had been on
the floor for a considerable period of time,
And either an employee was assigned the duty to observe and remove
the hazard, or a recent inspection should have discovered it.
Or:
A jury may infer that a defendant was negligent for failing to remove
a banana peel if its appearance and condition suggest it had been on
the floor for a considerable period of time,
And either of the following two tests are met:
(1) an employee of the defendant was
(a) present, and either
(b) guided plaintiff to the hazard, or,
(c) was assigned the duty to observe and remove the hazard.
(2) a recent inspection should have discovered the hazard.
Each of these rules meets the criteria of being simply stated, readily applied,
and consistent with the pertinent authorities. The students should understand
that more than one effective rule could be synthesized from the same set of
cases.
F. Applying their Synthesized Massachusetts-Banana Peel Rule
Working in their small groups, the students are now in a position to answer
the question of whether Sandy Banks can recover for the injury at Faneuil
Hall. They should apply their synthesized rule to the facts presented. Each
group can report its rule, application, and conclusion to the entire class. The
other groups can explain whether and why they agree or disagree. To solidify
what they have learned, and to show them how this process leads to a written
document, as they leave class they can be given a sample, structured discussion
of Sandy Bank’s issue.40
Conclusion
Students new to the law can learn to synthesize rules that are simply stated,
readily applied, and consistent with the pertinent authorities. Teaching them
this skill with actual cases exposes them to a situation that they correctly
40.

One such sample is set forth in the Appendix.
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perceive to be authentic and realistic. Having mastered their synthesis skills
in class with short but genuine opinions, they are prepared to synthesize rules
from longer opinions on their own.
APPENDIX
Sample CREAC re Sandy Banks & Faneuil Hall
A court is not likely to allow an inference of negligence against Faneuil
Hall for having a discolored banana peel on its floor for three reasons. First,
the peel may have been dropped by another recent visitor. Second, none of
Faneuil Hall’s employees was present to guide Sandy Banks toward the peel or
see it immediately before the accident. Third, Faneuil Hall employees had not
conducted a recent inspection that might have discovered the hazard.
In Massachusetts, a jury may infer that a defendant was negligent for failing
to remove a banana peel if the peel’s appearance and condition suggest it had
been on the floor for a considerable period of time, and either an employee of
the defendant was present to see the hazard or guided the plaintiff to it, or a
recent inspection should have discovered the hazard. See Scaccia v. Boston Elevated
Ry. Co., 57 N.E.2d 761, 765 (Mass. 1944); Mascary v. Boston Elevated Ry. Co., 155 N.E.
637 (Mass. 1927); Anjou v. Boston Elevated Ry. Co., 94 N.E. 386 (Mass. 1911); and
Goddard v. Boston & Me. R.R. Co., 60 N.E. 486 (Mass. 1901).
In Goddard, where no evidence refuted the possibility that a recently arrived
passenger may have dropped the banana peel on a crowded railroad platform,
the court affirmed a directed verdict for the defendant. 60 N.E. at 486. The
court reached a similar result in Mascary, where a woman slipped on a black,
soft, and dry banana peel while descending a flight of stairs at Central Square
Station. 155 N.E. at 637. As in Goddard, the Mascary court noted that some
stranger may have dropped the banana peel “a moment before” the accident.
Id.
The court came to the opposite conclusion in Anjou, allowing the inference
of negligence when a woman slipped and fell on a black, flattened banana peel
on a stairway at the Dudley Street terminal. 94 N.E. at 386. After the crowd
had thinned the woman had sought the assistance of a uniformed employee
and followed him to the stairway. Id. The court concluded that an inference
of negligence by the defendant was supported by the condition of the banana
peel and its position on the stairway where defendant’s employees might have
seen it. Id.
In Scaccia the court allowed the inference of negligence when a passenger
slipped on a black, dirty, gritty banana peel on the floor of a bus. 57 N.E.2d
at 765–66. The bus had left its terminus only nine minutes before the accident
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and was carrying only three passengers. Id. at 765. The condition of the peel
showed it had been lying on the floor so long that, “in the exercise of due care
the defendant should have discovered and removed it.” Id.
In Sandy Banks’ situation, the spotted, leathery condition of the banana
peel is not enough to support an inference that the owners of Faneuil Hall
were negligent for failing to discover and remove it. As in Mascary and Goddard,
the presence of a banana peel on the floor does not mean that the property
owner was negligent, as it might have been dropped by a recent visitor. See
155 N.E. at 637; 60 N.E. at 486. This rule applies even if the banana peel is
discolored and leathery. See Mascary, 155 N.E. at 637. In the Banks circumstance,
any one could have visited Faneuil Hall after hours, just as Sandy did. Such
a visitor could have eaten a banana and left the peel after the custodians had
completed their work.
For a jury to infer negligence there must be more than a discolored peel.
Unlike the situation in Anjou, here no employee guided Sandy through the
facility, nor was an employee in a position to see the banana peel immediately
before Sandy stepped on it. See 94 N.E. at 386. Nor had there been a recent
inspection that should have discovered the hazard. The custodians would
have completed their work after 9:00 p.m. (or 6:00 p.m. on Sundays) and
the accident took place many hours later, at some time subsequent to Sandy’s
arrival at 4:30 a.m. Such a lengthy open period is categorically different than
the nine-minute window in which a banana peel was not likely dropped after
the bus stopped at its terminus in Scaccia. See 57 N.E.2d at 765.
It might be argued that the brown, leathery condition of the banana peel
is enough to show that someone may have dropped it before the custodians
conducted their rounds. Such a showing is not enough to infer that Faneuil
Hall was negligent. The banana peel would have a brown and leathery
condition had it been dropped after the custodians left, but four, five or six
hours before Sandy’s arrival. The fact that it may have been on the floor for
several hours would show negligence if “it would have been seen and removed
by the employees of the defendant” in the reasonable performance of their
duties. See Anjou, 94 N.E. at 386. Since no employees of Faneuil Hall were on
duty after the custodians left, none would have been in a position to see and
remove a banana peel dropped after their departure.
No employee of Faneuil Hall guided Sandy toward the banana peel, and
none had an opportunity to see it immediately before the accident. Nor had
there been a recent inspection that, properly conducted, should have found
the peel. Accordingly, it is unlikely that a court will let a jury infer negligence
if Sandy Banks sues the possessors of Faneuil Hall.

